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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ALAN BOSWORTH SMITH, : Case No. 950640-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Although the state acknowledges in Appellee's Brief the 
importance of evidentiary value, the state has failed to cite to 
any part of the record establishing the identity of the garbage 
bag contents and the value of the contents to a potential or 
pending investigation or proceeding. The lack of evidence 
compels the determination that the judgment convicting 
Defendant/Appellant Alan Smith ("Smith") of tampering with 
evidence must be reversed. 
POINT I. THE CHARGE OF TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE NEVER 
SHOULD HAVE GONE TO THE JURY SINCE THE STATE FAILED TO 
PROVE A RELEVANT FACT. 
The state has accused Smith of failing to marshal the 
evidence supporting the jury's guilty verdict on the tampering 
charge. (Brief of Appellee, dated April 1, 1996 (hereinafter 
"Appellee's Brief"), at 1, 8, and 10.) That accusation 
apparently is made to divert attention from the state's failure 
at trial to prove a fact pertinent to the charge. Where the 
evidence is insufficient, the conviction cannot stand. See State 
v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. 
Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. 
Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 792-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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Specifically, at trial the state failed to present evidence 
concerning the garbage bag contents and failed to show that the 
contents had evidentiary value -- that they were relevant to a 
pending or potential investigation or proceeding. Where no 
evidence has been presented, no inference of evidentiary value 
can be drawn. See Krauss v. Utah St. Dept. of Trans., 852 P. 2d 
1014, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (since trial evidence dispelled 
existence of a critical factor, jury could not infer the opposite 
conclusion), overruled on other grounds, Child v. Newsome, 892 
P.2d 9, 11 n.4 (Utah 1995). Thus, the trial court erred in 
submitting the tampering charge to the jury. See State v. Harman, 
767 P.2d 567 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (insufficient evidence warrants 
dismissal); State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985). 
A. THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT DOES NOT PERMIT THE 
MANUFACTURING OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT. 
During trial and on appeal, the state has disregarded the 
issue of evidentiary value to focus on "evidence" that "amply" 
infers Smith's "intent" to commit the tampering offense. 
(Appellee's Brief at 7-11.) According to the state, "intent" was 
inferred because, 
1) [Smith failed] to report Barrett's death until after 
he disposed of the paraphernalia; 2) [Smith disposed] 
of the paraphernalia forty-five blocks from his home; 
3) [he misled] the 911 operator [by suggesting] he had 
reported the death as soon as he discovered it; 4) [he 
lied] to both the 911 operator and the investigating 
detective about drug involvement in Mr. Barrett's 
death; and 5) [he admitted] to police that he removed 
the paraphernalia so that the police would not find it 
with Mr. Barrett's body. 
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(Appellee's Brief at 11 and 14.) A review of the state's "ample" 
"evidence" reflects the following: 
One investigating officer identified by the state 
testified that Smith used controlled substances on 
February 20, 1995. (R. 601; Appellee's Brief at 5;1 
see also Appellant's Brief at 11, note 2.) 
Sometime during the morning of February 21, Smith 
stated he believed Barrett had passed away. (R. 531, 
605; Appellee's Brief at 9; Appellant's Brief at 7.) 
Thereafter, Othello Gerety ("Gerety") became hysterical 
and requested that Smith take her to Project Reality at 
700 South between 1st and 2nd East in Salt Lake City 
for methadone. (R. 531-32, 666; Appellant's Brief at 
7.) Rather than call 911, Smith took Gerety and Valerie 
Mackert ("Mackert") to Project Reality. (Appellee's 
Brief at 9; Appellant's Brief at 7.) 
Smith threw a garbage bag away at a convenience store 
in the vicinity of the methadone clinic. (Appellee's 
Brief at 9; Appellant's Brief at 7.) 
When Smith returned to his trailer at approximately 
3:30 p.m. he called 911 to report Barrett's death. 
(Appellee's Brief at 9; although the 911 tape was 
played for the jury, it was not transcribed. A copy of 
the transcript of the 911 call is attached hereto as an 
Addendum.) The transcript reflects that when the 
operator asked whether Barrett had overdosed, Smith was 
sobbing and upset. He responded to the operator: "I 
don't know. He came over here. I thought he was just 
drunk." (See attached Addendum at 6.) Nothing in the 
record suggests Smith should have been able to diagnose 
the cause of Barrett's death and determine for the 911 
operator that Barrett had overdosed. 
Additional "evidence" identified by the state is distorted. 
According to the state, when Detective Deven Higgins 
("Higgins") arrived at Smith's residence in response to 
the 911 call, Smith stated to Higgins that "Barrett 
drank too much, passed out, and never woke up (R. 486). 
The condition of Mr. Barrett's body led the detective 
to conclude that a drug overdose caused Mr. Barrett's 
death; however, when he confronted defendant with his 
conclusion, defendant denied any drug involvement (R. 
1
 The state has provided additional citations to the record that 
do not support the proposition that Smith used controlled substances. 
(See Appellee's Brief at 5 and citations to record set forth therein.) 
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487). " (Appellee's Brief at 10.) The state 
conveniently has omitted the following emphasized 
portions of Higgins' testimony: 
According to Higgins, Smith told him that 
"Barrett had come over to his house and had 
been partying and had drunk too much alcohol 
and had passed out and had not woken up." 
(R. 486.) 
Higgins testified on direct examination that 
(i) Smith denied "any drug involvement" (R. 
487) and (ii) Smith maintained that position 
in a written statement, identified as the 
state's proposed Exhibit 4. (R. 487.) 
On cross examination, Higgins was forced to 
acknowledge that his testimony on direct 
examination was incorrect. He admitted (i) 
the written statement, Exhibit 4, reflected 
nBarrett did cocaine" (R. 496), (ii) that 
during questioning Smith did not deny Barrett 
used drucrs (R. 495-96) , and (iii) and that 
Smith initially told officers that Barrett 
had been "partying" on February 20, 19 95. 
Higgins acknowledged that term commonly 
"refers to the use of drugs." (R. 497.) 
According to the state, Detective Alex Huggard 
("Huggard") testified that Smith "admitted" telling 
Gerety and Mackert "to clean up the paraphernalia 
because [Smith] did not want to explain it when the 
police came and found Mr. Barrett's body (R. 603-604, 
609)." (Appellee's Brief at 10.) In Appellee's Brief, 
the state failed to disclose the following: Huggard 
testified on direct examination that (i) he engaged in 
two interviews with Smith (R. 599), (ii) the second 
interview was tape-recorded (R. 599), and (iii) during 
both interviews Smith allegedly made that same 
"admission." (R. 609 (Huggard testified that during 
the second, recorded interview, Smith said "the same 
thing, that he feared that [Barrett] might not make it, 
and so that he had [Gerety] and [Mackert] pick up the 
drug paraphernalia").) In addition, the state failed 
to disclose that on cross-examination, Huggard was 
forced to acknowledge that Smith did not make such an 
"admission" during the second, recorded interview 
(compare R. 609 with R. 612-14 and 631), and he 
acknowledged that he could not recall with complete 
accuracy the content of the first, unrecorded interview 
with Smith. (R. 630-31.) 
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Given Huggard's and Higgins' testimony, the jury could not 
have inferred intent as suggested by the state. At most, the 
jury could have believed Higgins and Huggard. In that instance, 
the evidence reflects that (i) Smith did not deny to officers 
that Barrett used drugs and (ii) Huggard acknowledged 
inaccuracies in his testimony. On the other hand, the jury could 
have given their "testimony no weight, wholly disregarding [the] 
testimony." Krauss, 852 P.2d at 1022. In that instance, the 
jury "could not, by any rational process, have concluded that 
[the] testimony was evidence" of Smith's intent. Id. However 
the jury chose to resolve the matter, Higgins and Huggard both 
acknowledged problems with their testimony; the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive on the issue of Smith's "intent." 
Even if the inferences identified by the state support that 
Smith had the requisite culpability to commit the offense of 
tampering, as set forth in Appellant's Brief and below, the state 
established only one element of the charge and wholly failed to 
present evidence establishing (i) the identity of the garbage bag 
contents as "paraphernalia" and (ii) the contents' evidentiary 
value. See State v. Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577, 576 (Utah App. 1988). 
B. THE VERDICT CANNOT BE AFFIRMED WHERE THE EVIDENCE 
IS INSUFFICIENT. 
Rather than address the evidentiary issue, the state 
launched into the following arguments and propositions: 
In connection with a tampering charge, "[t]he critical 
inquiry is what defendant believed, not whether the 
state would need to rely on what he concealed to prove 
facts in this or some other proceeding." (Appellee's 
Brief at 12.) 
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"The [tampering] statute does not require potential 
investigations to ripen into actual investigations or 
criminal actions against defendant." (Id. at 13.) 
Inadmissible evidence seized during a search can still 
support a tampering charge. (Id. at 12 (citing State 
v. Wacrstaff, 846 P. 2d 1311, 1311-12 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).) 
The state's focus is misplaced. 
1. Only Part of the Inquiry Concerns "What Defendant 
Believed;" Another Part of the Inquiry Is Whether the 
State Presented Foundational Facts of Evidentiary 
Value. 
According to the state, the Utah tampering statute requires 
the state to show "only that defendant removed or concealed 
something to prevent its use in a potential investigation that 
defendant believed would occur." (Appellee's Brief at 12.) The 
state also asserts that the jury could infer that Smith 
anticipated an investigation into Barrett's death "and concealed 
evidence relevant to that investigation," based on the fact that 
Smith threw the garbage bag into a convenience store dumpster 
before contacting authorities. (Appellee's Brief at 14 (emphasis 
added).) The state's argument breaks down at the point where the 
state assumes the garbage bag contained "evidence relevant to 
that investigation." In fact, the state has failed to cite to 
any portion of the record in support of such an assumption.2 
2
 The marshaled evidence reflects that Huggard's testimony is the 
only evidence presented at trial concerning the garbage bag contents. 
He testified that Smith had been after Gerety for some time prior to 
February 20, 1995, to dispose of syringes in her possession and directed 
her that evening to throw them away. (R. 613-14.) Thereafter, Gerety 
and/or Mackert gave Smith a garbage bag. Huggard further testified that 
on February 21, 1995, he took possession of a garbage bag from Smith and 
(continued...) 
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An illustration of the importance of evidentiary value is in 
order: The players are Victim, Suspect and Roommate. Roommate 
owns a gun. Suspect has been after her for sometime to get rid 
of it. Victim and his friends go to a party at Suspect and 
Roommate's home, and Victim brings his gun. Victim shoots and 
kills himself at Suspect's home with his gun. Suspect is scared 
z
 (...continued) 
"placed [into evidence] drug paraphernalia that we had found, the garbage 
bag, etc." (R. 606-07, 640-41.) During the trial, when he was asked 
about the garbage bag contents, Huggard stated the following: 
[Huggard] I would have to take out [the contents of the 
garbage bag] and examine them. I recognize the bag, but I 
don't know what the contents are. 
Q [Question] Okay. 
[Huggard] If I may look at them, I could give you a 
clearer answer to that, sir. 
Q [Question] Okay. You don't know what this in total is? 
[Huggard] I do know what the exhibit is, it's a bag 
that I've identified that I put into evidence, but I'd like to 
look at the contents before I could tell you if that's --
Q [Question] Okay. 
[Huggard] What is there, sir. 
Q [Question] All right. Why don't you go ahead and do 
that? 
[Huggard] It appears to be the same. 
Q [Question] All right. And none of the -- the items in 
this brown bag marked Exhibit 6 of the State, have ever been 
analyzed for the presence of any drugs, controlled substances? 
[Huggard] Not to my knowledge, no, sir. 
(R. 638.) Significantly, the garbage bag contains neatly packaged 
svrincres that avvear to be unused. (State's Exhibit 6.) Given the lack 
of evidence, and the failure to specifically identify the contents of the 
bag as information relevant to an investigation or proceeding, the 
reasonable inference is that Gerety and Mackert placed Gerety's unused 
syringes in the garbage bag and gave them to Smith for disposal. 
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and believes officers will search his home as part of an 
investigation relating to Victim's death. Before calling 
officers to the scene, Suspect again insists that Roommate get 
rid of her gun. Roommate hands a garbage bag to Suspect and 
Suspect takes the bag to a dumpster downtown for disposal. When 
officers are called to the home, they do not locate the gun that 
killed Victim and they notice there is no garbage from the party. 
They ask Suspect about the gun and the garbage, he goes downtown, 
and he retrieves a garbage bag for officers. Suspect is charged 
with tampering with evidence. At trial, the officers recognize 
the bag and its contents as that which was retrieved from the 
dumpster, but they never identify the contents of the garbage 
bag. In addition, they fail to testify with regard to the 
evidentiary value of the garbage bag contents. In its case 
against Suspect, is the state required to present foundational 
facts concerning the garbage bag contents and connecting the 
contents to a potential or pending investigation or proceeding? 
Should Suspect be convicted on the lack of evidence? 
In another illustration, State v. Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577, 578 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), the defendant was charged with assaulting a 
police officer while in custody at the Salt Lake County jail. 
During discovery, defendant learned that as part of standard 
procedures, jail personnel made videotapes of bookings and 
subsequently erased them after 72 hours if no one made a request 
to retain them. Based on that information, defendant moved to 
dismiss the charge and asserted that jail personnel recorded the 
8 
alleged assault on videotape, the videotape was relevant to her 
defense, and jail personnel erased the videotape. The trial 
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, "for the reason 
that the state failed to retain any videotape of the incident." 
On appeal, this Court stated the following: 
Although defense counsel claimed that the erased 
videotape contained evidence material to the defense, 
no evidence was presented that the video equipment was 
operating in the booking area on the appropriate night 
and either actually or most likely captured on tape the 
alleged assault. Defendant thus failed to establish 
the foundational fact of the existence of evidence. 
Id. Because the defendant in Jiminez failed to establish 
evidentiary value, this Court reversed the dismissal.3 
In this matter, although the state was in possession of the 
garbage bag and its contents since February 21, 1995, the state 
failed to elicit testimony, even from the officers, as to whether 
the garbage bag contained used drug paraphernalia, items used by 
Barrett, items used in Smith's trailer, or items relevant to a 
potential or pending proceeding or investigation. In fact, the 
garbage bag contained a neat, clean package of unused syringes. 
(See note 2, supra; State's Exhibit 6.) Did officers contemplate 
3
 See also Gill v. State, 622 So.2d 92, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993) ; State v. Murray, 349 So.2d 707, 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (in 
connection with the charge of tampering with a witness, the alleged 
victim must be or must have been a fact witness and the defendant must 
know that the alleged victim was a fact witness) ; State v. Howe, 247 
N.W.2d 647, 653 (N.D. 1976) (in considering the application of a witness 
tampering statute: "All that is necessary is that the person be one who 
knows or is supposed to know material facts and is expected to testify 
to them or to be called on to testify") ; State v. Peck, 459 N.W.2d 441, 
444 (S.D. 1990); United States v. Jackson, 513 F.2d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) ("Indubitably, one is a witness, within the meaning of [the witness 
tampering statute], when he knows or is supposed to know material facts, 
and expectably is to be called to testify to them"). 
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those contents in connection with some investigation or 
proceeding, whether or not proceedings were instituted? If so, 
why did they fail to say as much at trial?4 Since the state 
failed to make a showing of evidentiary value, it failed to 
establish a critical factor. 
The state has described in its brief the relevance of 
"evidentiary value": " [D]rug paraphernalia found at the same 
location as a body showing signs consistent with a drug overdose 
would provide additional circumstantial evidence as to the cause 
of death. Furthermore, drug paraphernalia would have had 
evidentiary value for possible investigations into defendant's 
drug use, defendant's presence during drug use, defendant 
providing a place for drug use, and defendant's possession of 
controlled substances or paraphernalia." (Appellee's Brief at 
13.) Because the state failed to identify the contents of the 
garbage bag, the state has no basis for asserting that the unused 
items would have had any such "value to the investigation." (Id.) 
Since the evidence in this matter reflects that the garbage 
bag contained apparently Gerety's unused syringes (see note 2, 
supra), the "evidence" hardly provides officers with information 
concerning Barrett's cause of death, drug use or drug possession 
at Smith's trailer. Unlike the issue of "intent", which usually 
is not susceptible to direct proof and is often inferred from the 
4
 The state claims that "[t]he [tampering] statute does not require 
potential investigations to ripen into actual investigations or criminal 
actions against defendant" (Appellee's Brief at 13). That proposition 
does not address the issue of evidentiary value. 
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circumstances,5 the issue of evidentiary value in this matter 
could be presented only by the state and was susceptible to 
direct proof. The state had exclusive control and possession of 
the garbage bag contents since February 21, 1995, the state's 
officers could testify to the actual contents of the garbage bag, 
and the state's officers could testify to the relevance of such 
contents in a potential or pending investigation or proceeding. 
Since the state failed to present foundational facts of 
evidentiary value, the conviction must be reversed. See State v. 
Wooden, 619 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). » [T]here is 
no indication" that the garbage bag was further "subject to 
identification and thus its value as evidence is highly 
questionable." Radar v. State, 420 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1982). 
2. The "Admissibility" of Evidence and "Evidentiary 
Value" Are Distinct and Separate Concepts. 
Smith does not dispute that inadmissible evidence may 
support a tampering charge. In State v. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d at 
1311, authorities observed drug paraphernalia in a plastic bag in 
plain view, arrested and handcuffed Wagstaff in connection with 
the observed baggy, and observed Wagstaff place the baggy in his 
mouth and chew on it. Wagstaff was charged with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance and tampering with evidence, 
5
 State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing 
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985)) ("intent need not be 
proved by direct evidence, buy may be inferred from defendant's conduct 
and surrounding circumstances"). 
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and later with interfering with an arresting officer. Id. at 
1312. Although the admissibility of the drug paraphernalia was 
an issue in that case, the parties did not raise the issue of 
evidentiary value.6 In this matter, the evidentiary value of 
the garbage bag contents was not established. 
C. PURPOSE AND BELIEF CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED WITH 
MISREPRESENTED AND MISSING FACTS AND INFERENCES. 
The state asserts that the evidence establishes or infers 
that Smith believed an investigation or proceeding would be 
conducted by authorities and Smith acted with purpose to make 
"the drug paraphernalia" unavailable to authorities. (Appellee's 
Brief at 13-14.) In support of those assertions, the state 
references the same facts and inferences attributed to Appellee's 
Brief above, which facts and inferences are not supported by the 
evidence. 
In addition, because the state failed to establish the 
identity of the garbage bag contents, the evidence cannot support 
that Smith "had the purpose to make the drug paraphernalia 
unavailable." Since the garbage bag contained Gerety's unused 
syringes (see note 2, supra), neither purpose nor belief can be 
inferred. 
Although the jury rendered a verdict of guilty in this 
matter, such a verdict does not assume that the actual and 
6
 The evidentiary value in that case is clear. The officers 
identified the contents of the baggy as a controlled substance; the 
controlled substance was linked to an investigation and charges against 
Wagstaff for unlawful possession. 
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circumstantial facts were sufficiently established. Indeed, 
guilty verdicts are reversed where the lack of evidence 
undermines them. See State v. Salasf 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (jury's conviction of defendant on charge of 
possession of controlled substance was reversed where evidence 
failed to establish nexus between defendant and controlled 
substance). The marshaled evidence in this case cannot save the 
state's failure to establish through actual or circumstantial 
evidence the evidentiary value of the garbage bag contents. 
POINT II. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT FOR JOINING THE CHARGES 
IS SUPPORTED BY FALSE ASSUMPTIONS. 
The crux of the state's argument concerning severance of the 
charges is that the "trial court properly exercised its 
discretion to leave the charges joined because it could have 
admitted evidence of each [charge] in separate trials for the 
other." (Appellee's Brief at 16.)7 In support of that notion, 
7
 The state incorrectly asserts that "on appeal, defendant limits 
his argument to the manslaughter and evidence tampering charges." 
(Appellee's Brief at 16.) A cursory review of Smith's opening brief 
reflects that Smith has urged severance of the three charged offenses: 
"Since the charges of homicide, failing to report the finding 
of a dead body, and tampering with evidence in this matter did 
not occur under 'identical' circumstances, the 'same conduct' 
language of the statute is inapplicable." 
"[I]n this matter the State failed to demonstrate how 
Barrett's death, the alleged failure to report the finding of 
a dead body, and the garbage that Smith retrieved for 
authorities from the dumpster were connected. Since the 
events have not been linked together, it was error for the 
trial court to refuse to sever the charges." 
"[T]he record contains no evidence to support the notion that 
Smith was motivated by a single objective to commit the 
(continued...) 
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the state presupposes that real or circumstantial evidence 
connecting the garbage bag contents to the events of February 20, 
1995, was presented at trial: 
"Evidence that Mr. Barrett died from a drug overdose at 
defendant's party, and that defendant summoned no 
medical aid when Mr. Barrett first collapsed 
established a motive for defendant to make evidence of 
drug- use unavailable . . . " ; 
"Evidence of the manslaughter also provided a basis for 
the jury to infer that defendant threw away the 
paraphernalia . . . "; 
"Evidence that defendant recklessly caused Mr. 
Barrett's death. . . would allow the jury to infer. . . 
that [Smith] intended to make circumstantial evidence 
of his involvement with what caused Mr. Barrett's death 
unavailable in that investigation"; 
"suspicion of an overdose led [police] to question 
defendant about drug use, which in turn led to the 
discovery of the drug paraphernalia: the police 
witnesses could not explain the events leading to 
discovery of the drug paraphernalia without testifying 
about what caused Mr. Barrett's death." 
(Appellee's Brief at 16-24 (emphasis added).) Because the state 
failed to present evidence that the garbage bag contained "drug 
paraphernalia" or the instrument that "caused Mr. Barrett's 
(...continued) 
alleged offenses. An objective review of the record reflects 
just the opposite as argued by the State: according to the 
prosecutor, Smith allegedly committed homicide to avoid being 
implicated in the 'risks' of drug use in his home, R. 759, 
785; Smith allegedly committed the offense of failing to 
report a dead body for selfish reasons --so that he could 'go 
out and do other things', R. 761; Smith allegedly committed 
the offense of tampering with evidence ' in anticipation of the 
police coming [over] with the death of Mr. Barrett' . R. 759, 
788. By the State's own admissions, Smith was not motivated 
by the same objective to complete the alleged offenses." 
(Appellant's Brief at 23, 24, 30-31 (emphasis added).) Inasmuch as the 
state has failed to address severing the charge of tampering from the 
charge of failing to report a dead body, the judgment in this case should 
be reversed on that basis. 
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death," the state's argument fails (see Point I, supra). Without 
specifically identifying the garbage bag contents as used drug 
paraphernalia or instruments relevant to the events of February 
20, 1995, the jury had no basis for inferring motive or intent 
under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence,8 particularly since 
the bag contained unused syringes. (See note 2, supra.) 
With respect to Rule 403, it cautions against the 
prejudicial effect of admitting evidence relating to separate 
charges. The trial judge's post-trial statements accentuate the 
dangers: 
Now, you have this homicide part of the trial, the 
manslaughter part of the trial in there where Mr. Smith 
did not inject the drugs. [He] provided the home. 
[He] did not call 9-1-1, did not do anything other than 
let [Barrett] sleep the night, thinking [Barrett] was 
coming out of his overdose and then found him dead in 
the morning. 
Now, he -- with that part in the trial, it seems to me 
that the jury could well have thought, well, look, if we 
take [the homicide] part out, we can convict him of the 
failure to report and of the tampering with evidence. 
• * * 
Well, this is a -- I will tell you, this has been a 
major difficulty for me to deal with, because I will say 
that it is my belief that there was -- that the jury was 
correct by not convicting [Smith] on the manslaughter 
[charge] and that the manslaughter charge overrode all of 
the rest of the case. 
(R. 833, 841.) In addition, the trial judge disclosed a letter 
to the court from a jury member who suffered "buyer's remorse." 
The juror disclosed that by convicting Smith of tampering and 
8
 Rule 404(b) precludes the introduction of evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts unless the evidence shows motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
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failing to report a dead body, the jury had committed an 
injustice. (R. 832-33.) The trial judge apparently agreed with 
the juror, and stated the following: 
I have some serious problems in this case, and if this 
case were tried just as a tampering case, I'd feel 
different about it; or if it were tried just as a 
failure to report a dead body. But the juror basically 
says that his will was overridden by other jurors. 
Now, that's okay, that happens in jury rooms; but this 
case, I will tell you, is one that has [given] me some 
very serious pause. 
(R. 834-35. ) 9 Then the trial judge stated, "it will be the 
decision of this Court that the motion of the defense for a new 
trial shall be granted. . . I do believe that Mr. Smith should be 
tried on the charge of tampering with evidence. Well, I don't 
know, I'm going to think about this for a minute before I render 
a ruling." (Id. (emphasis added).) Thereafter, the trial court 
reversed itself, denied the motion for a new trial, and sentenced 
Smith to incarceration, a fine, a surcharge, and recoupment fees. 
(R. 846.) 
Smith is asking this Court to reinstate the trial court's 
original ruling: reverse the conviction and provide Smith with a 
new trial since the evidence relating to the charges of 
manslaughter and failing to report a dead body sacrificed Smith's 
right to a fundamentally fair trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
8a-l(4) (a) (1995) (charges must be severed if defendant "is 
prejudiced by a joinder"); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 116-17 
9
 The trial court ultimately granted Smith's motion to dismiss the 
charge of failing to report a dead body after the jury rendered a guilty 
verdict on that charge. (R. 845-46.) 
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(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
POINT III. THE STATE'S ADMISSIONS CONCERNING GERETY'S 
HEARSAY TESTIMONY COMPEL THE DETERMINATION THAT THE 
TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE GONE TO THE JURY. 
A. THE STATE ASSERTS THAT GERETY'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT 
RELEVANT TO THE TAMPERING CHARGE; THUS, IT SERVED ONLY 
TO PREJUDICE SMITH. 
The state initially argued in the severance portion of its 
brief that "the facts supporting the tampering charge were too 
intertwined with those supporting the manslaughter charge" to 
warrant severance of the charges. (Appellee's Brief at 20.) The 
state subsequently argued in support of admitting Gerety's 
hearsay statements into evidence that her prior statements were 
"mostly relevant to the State's manslaughter theory" -- and 
apparently not so "intertwined." (Appellee's Brief at 27.) 
While the state apparently has retreated from its earlier 
position, one truth is clear: The overwhelming evidence at trial 
implicating Smith in criminal conduct was presented in the form 
of hearsay testimony.10 In addition, the prosecutor made 
numerous references before the jury to Gerety's testimony in an 
10
 In fact, in Appellee's Brief the state has cited almost 
exclusively to the hearsay testimony of Gerety, Higgins and Huggard to 
support inferences allegedly implicating Smith in criminal conduct. 
(Higgins' testimony: R. 482-519, 615-625, 690-696; Huggard's testimony: 
R. 597-614, 629-50; Gerety's testimony: R. 654-690.) As stated herein 
and in Appellant's Brief, the trial court should have excluded Gerety's 
out-of-court statements. In addition, as set forth in Point I of the 
Argument, supra, since Higgins and Huggard acknowledged misstatements in 
their testimony, if the jury believed them, the evidence reflects that 
the testimony is incomplete and inconsistent. On the other hand, if the 
jury disbelieved Higgins' and Huggard's testimony, it should not have 
given the testimony weight, and should have disregarded it. Krauss, 852 
P. 2d at 1022. However the jury chose to resolve the credibility issues 
surrounding Higgins and Huggard, the evidence was inconclusive. 
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effort to implicate Smith in a parade of horrors on February 20 
and 21, 1995. (See R. at 759-768; 784-791.) If Gerety's 
testimony was so irrelevant to the tampering charge as the state 
asserts, the charges should have been severed, or in the 
alternative, the hearsay testimony should not have been admitted 
in connection with the tampering charge. 
B. THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT OFFICIALS PUT LITTLE 
EFFORT INTO LOCATING GERETY. 
In further considering Gerety's hearsay testimony in this 
matter, the state acknowledges the following: (1) officers knew 
Gerety suffered health problems but checked only two area 
hospitals; (2) officers knew Gerety did not have a permanent 
address but made no inquiries and conducted no searches outside 
the downtown Salt Lake area; and (3) officers waited until less 
than three weeks before trial to begin their search, yet they had 
taken a full three weeks to locate Gerety in connection with 
serving an arrest warrant on her. (Appellee's Brief at 25-26.) 
In addition, the state suggests it was Smith's burden to show 
that Gerety was available (Appellee's Brief at 27 ("Significant-
ly, defendant, Ms. Gerety's former boyfriend, did not offer any 
information about Ms. Gerety's whereabouts or make any showing 
that the State could have found her if it had looked harder"), 
and attempts to excuse its dilatory conduct by asserting, 
"hindsight may suggest additional, desirable measures but does 
not establish [an abuse of discretion]." (Id.) 
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Since the state sought to offer the hearsay testimony into 
evidence in lieu of the witness, it was the state's burden to 
prove Gerety's unavailability. State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). That 
burden is not shifted to the defense to show "availability," as 
the state suggests. 
With regard to the state's reference to "hindsight," at the 
time the officers launched into their late search of Gerety, they 
had the benefit of Utah Supreme Court precedent identifying the 
"additional, desirable measures." See State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 
1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1989) ("Every reasonable effort must be made 
to produce the witness"); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 540 
(Utah 1981) (in locating a witness, the court identified 
searching bus terminals and using out-of-state police); State v. 
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982) (in locating a witness, the 
court expressed a preference for using the Uniform Act to Secure 
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal 
Proceedings); State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645 (Utah 1995) (in 
locating a witness, the court recognized the use of federal 
agencies, U.S. Marshals and investigators). In addition, in this 
matter, officers could draw on their own past experiences. 
Again, they knew from past experience (i) they would need at 
least three weeks to find Gerety, (ii) she had health problems 
and numerous hospitals are located in the Salt Lake Valley, and 
(iii) she did not have a permanent residence and numerous 
agencies could be explored, including federal and transportation 
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agencies. The officers and state simply opted to disregard the 
additional desirable measures. 
The state's presentation of Gerety's hearsay testimony was 
prejudicial to Smith and an abuse of discretion. It contributed 
substantially to the verdict. Other evidence incriminating Smith 
came from the officers, who admitted during trial that they could 
not accurately and fully recall the content of hearsay statements 
made by Smith. (See Argument, Point I.A., supra.) They also 
admitted during trial that they failed to accurately and 
completely recount Smith's statements. (Id.) Gerety's hearsay 
testimony is the strongest evidence implicating Smith in drug use 
on February 20, 1995, Barrett's death and other conduct. Those 
witnesses who were at Smith's trailer on February 20, 1995, 
contradicted Gerety's hearsay testimony, underscoring the 
importance of (i) providing the defendant with the right to 
confront such a witness as Gerety, and (ii) allowing the jury to 
assess the witness's credibility and demeanor. Since the trial 
court permitted the state to present the hearsay testimony, the 
trial court took an important function away from the jury and 
denied Smith his right to confront a critical witness. 
CONCLUSION 
Smith respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing 
the conviction against him on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence. In the alternative, Smith respectfully requests the 
entry of an order vacating the judgment and conviction against 
him and remanding the case for a new trial on the tampering 
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charge only, without the admission into evidence of Gerety's 
hearsay testimony. 
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ADDENDUM A 
STATE V. SMITH 
911 CALL 
FEBRUARY 21, 1995 
OPERATOR: 911. 
SMITH: Yes. I just got home. I'm at 225 Biltmore Avenue. 
OPERATOR: Uh hum (affirmative). 
SMITH: A friend of mine stayed here last night, and I just 
came home. I've been gone all morning. And I think 
he's dead. I don't know what's wrong with him. 
He's, he's like, there's stuff coming out of his 
nose. He, he don't look good. 
OPERATOR: Is he breathing? 
SMITH: I don't think so. 
OPERATOR: Can you check, to see if you see his chest rising 
for me? 
SMITH: His chest isn't rising. I checked. 
OPERATOR: It is not? 
SMITH: And I pressed on him. 
OPERATOR: Uh hum. 
SMITH: There's like foam coming out of his nose. 
OPERATOR: Uh hum. 
SMITH: And when I pressed on him, it just made foam, more 
foam come out. 
OPERATOR: Uh huh. So you don't, you don't--
SMITH: Can you send someone, please, fast. 
OPERATOR: Yeh, we will. You don't see any breath coming out 
at all? 
SMITH: I don't. There's nothing. 
OPERATOR: Okay. And you don't know how long it's been? 
SMITH: No. I've been gone since I, about eleven o'clock. 
OPERATOR: Okay. How old is he? 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
Uh, around 22, 23 years old. 
Twenty-three ? 
Twenty-three or something like that. I, I used to 
go out with his mom. 
Uh hum. 
I mean, you know, he comes over last night. He came 
over. And he was drunk. 
Yah. 
And I put him to bed. 
Okay. 
And I thought everything was okay. In fact, when I 
left this morning about eleven o'clock, I opened the 
door and everything, you know, he looked fine. He 
had a smile on his face. I thought he was fine. 
Is he blue? 
I, it's hard to tell. He's a Mexican kid. 
So like there's foam coming out of his mouth? 
There's foam coming out of his nostrils. 
Okay. 
(inaudible) 
You what? 
I (inaudible). Can you please send somebody over? 
_, sir, and I'm going to I, I already did 
keep you on the phone to get some more information. 
Okay? 
Okay. 
I've already sent 
apartment or a--
It's a, a--
It's a home? 
to your home. Is this an 
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SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
OPERATOR: 
SMITH: 
A trailer. 
It's a trailer. What the name of your mobile home 
park? 
Cottonwood Cove. 
Cottonwood Cove? What's your lot number? 
I don't know the lot number, but it's, my address is 
225 Biltmore. 
So do you think that's your lot number? 
No, I think my lot number's something different. 
But if they, when they come into Cottonwood Cove--
Okay. Hold on a minute. Let me tell me that you 
don't know your lot number. 
And I have it written down on one of my rent 
receipts or something, I'm sure, but--
Okay. Now can you give me directions how to get in 
there? 
Okay. See, you come in the park--
Uh hah. 
And then go over a bridge--
Enter park. 
And make the first right. 
Okay. Wait, hold on a sec, 
Okay. And then turn right 
Go over the bridge. 
First right and second left. Called Biltmore, 
at 225 Biltmore. Please send somebody quick. 
I'm 
I've already sent them, sir. I'll need to keep you 
on the phone now. Okay? Second right, or second 
left, right? 
Yeh, the second left. 
First right, then left. 
Go over the bridge, first right--
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OPERATOR: And then left, right? 
SMITH: Second left. 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
SMITH: Second left. 
OPERATOR: So you seen him last night and he was drinking? 
SMITH: Yeh, well, he came over last night. 
OPERATOR: Uh huh. 
SMITH: And he passed out on my couch. So I put him to bed, 
you know, and, and last I checked on him, he was 
snoring away, you know. 
OPERATOR: Do you want to try CPR? 
SMITH: I, and I mean--
OPERATOR: Do you want to try CPR? 
SMITH: I mean, he's stiff. 
OPERATOR: Oh, he's stiff? 
SMITH: I went in there and just touched him (inaudible). 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
SMITH: I mean, when I, when I opened the door and I seen 
that, I seen this white shine on his nose. So I 
went over and touched him, and the man's dead. 
OPERATOR: Okay. And he's about 23, you say? 
SMITH: Yeh. 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
SMITH: And I've been gone for a few hours. I had to take 
my, my girlfriend's on acilin. 
OPERATOR: When was the last time you seen him alive--last 
night or this morning? 
SMITH: Yeh. About, well, about midnight, it's when I went 
to bed. 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
SMITH: Midnight or two o'clock. And, and I checked on him 
before I went to bed, and he was breathing and 
snoring. As a matter of fact, he was snoring up a 
storm. I thought that he was fine. 
OPERATOR: Uh hum. 
SMITH: I mean, you know, 'cause when he passed out like he 
did, I just, you know, I was worried about him. And 
we put him to bed and he was just snoring up a 
storm, so I thought that he was fine. 
OPERATOR: Uh hum. 
SMITH: I mean, he did drink a couple of days ago. 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
SMITH: I mean, he came over and he passed out right on my 
floor, you know. And everybody was dancing around 
and, you know, most of the night. And so, last 
night, I really didn't say anything. I just, he 
came over with a couple of guys. 
OPERATOR: Where he's at now? 
SMITH: He's in my room, my spare bedroom. 
OPERATOR: So is he on the bed, like he just kind of passed out 
and stayed there, huh? 
SMITH: Yah. I mean, he was fine. 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
SMITH: But he isn't fine anymore. 
OPERATOR: What's your last name, sir? 
SMITH: My name is Smith. 
OPERATOR: And your first name? 
SMITH: Alan, A-L-A-N. 
OPERATOR: Okay. And your phone number there? 
SMITH: 265-2625. 
OPERATOR: Okay. We've got a . We're just going to 
keep you on the phone. Do you have any animals in 
your home? 
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SMITH: No. They all died, too. 
OPERATOR: Anybody else there with you? 
SMITH: Yeh. My friend Valerie. 
OPERATOR: Okay. stiff. 
SMITH: He's . Oh, my God! 
OPERATOR: What? 
SMITH: (sobbing) He's dead. 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
SMITH: She just barely looked at him. 
OPERATOR: She's checking him? 
SMITH: She, he's dead. 
OPERATOR: What did she say? 
SMITH: She said, "He's gone." 
OPERATOR: Do you think he overdosed on something, or--
SMITH: I don't know. He came over here. I thought he was 
just drunk. 
OPERATOR: Does he do drugs at all, that you're aware of? 
SMITH: Uh, Uh, I don't know, I don't know. 
OPERATOR: Well, he could have, I don't know, it could have 
been a number of things, I guess. 
SMITH: I don't know. He came, he came, he came over here. 
He's in there. They're here. 
(crying in background) 
OPERATOR: Hello. (pause) Hello. (pause) Are you there? 
SMITH: (crying in background) Oh, no! 
OPERATOR: Hello. (pause) Hello. (pause) Hello. 
END OF CONVERSATION 
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